


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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Czechoslovakia: Husak's Warning

Party boss Husak's tough condemnation of Alexander Dubcek on Wednesday was a clear warning that the regime will tolerate no further dissidence from any segment of the population. Husak specifically rebuked the ousted leader of the 1968 Prague Spring and those who form "not large, but not entirely insignificant" groups that are in outright opposition to the regime.

The recent publication in the Western press of the "Dubcek letter" appealing for the rule of law sparked Husak's attack. The leadership has been debating the highly controversial question of how to deal with the 1968 reformers--and particularly Dubcek--ever since Husak came to power six years ago.

The debate has, however, sharpened considerably since last November's plenum of the party Central Committee. The plenum, which convened shortly after Dubcek sent his letter to parliament, dealt with economic and cadre problems. Although the speeches made at the meeting have never been published, Husak's condemnation of Dubcek suggests that hard liners in the party have now gained the upper hand, especially on the question of selective rehabilitation of middle-level reformers and recalcitrant intellectuals.

Husak struck another ominous note by stating that some dissidents had mistakenly interpreted his avoidance of "administrative methods"--arrests and executions--as stupidity and that they thus became bolder. His pointed warning that there are limits to Prague's tolerance suggests that a tougher policy toward all citizens will be announced in the very near future. Husak stated that the Central Committee will meet next week to "examine certain

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proposals in the sphere of social policy" that will constitute an "important step for a great section of the population."

Husak also made it clear that the regime would prefer to have Dubcek leave Czechoslovakia, saying that the ousted leader "can pack his bags tomorrow if he likes and go to any bourgeois state." From Prague's point of view, Dubcek's decision to take the "Solzhenitsyn solution" would sharply reduce Western media attention to all 1968 reformers. The regime feels that over time, Dubcek would become just another ineffective emigre critic. By describing Dubcek and his associates as renegades, traitors, slanderers of the Soviet Union, and outright enemies of the people, he left the door open for further harassment and possible punitive action.

Thus, next week's plenum plus Dubcek's reaction to Husak's condemnation will set the stage for action in Prague. Should Dubcek run true to form, he will stubbornly refuse to go into exile. Other regime spokesman have now weighed in with condemnations of Dubcek, thus increasing pressure on him. The regime, however, would probably stop short of making a national martyr of him. In any event, Husak has now drawn the line, and any retreat from his stand will risk deepening the divisions in the party. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Hungarian Attacks on Nationalism

Romanian diplomats in Budapest have told a US official that they believe recent Hungarian attacks on nationalism were inspired by Moscow and were directed partly at Bucharest. Their statements, along with the recent assertion by another Romanian diplomat that tensions with Moscow have increased (*Staff Notes*, April 15), suggest that Bucharest is making a concerted effort to draw Western attention to its alleged problems.

At least three high-level Hungarian statements over the last three weeks have included strongly worded rejections of "chauvinist, nationalistic, and anti-Soviet" views that endanger Communist unity. None has contained any specific anti-Romanian twist, but all have been directed against any party that disagrees with Moscow, particularly the Chinese. For instance, Foreign Minister Puja's attack on socialist leaders not aligned with the USSR referred directly to the Chinese although some observers in Budapest still consider the real target was Bucharest. Romanian leader Ceausescu was the only Warsaw Pact party chief who did not attend the Hungarian party congress last month.

In their talk with the US official, the Romanians showed little outward concern over the Hungarian attacks and claimed that Budapest's current economic difficulties increase its ever-present need to curry favor with the Kremlin. They added that praise for the Soviets, noticeable during the party congress and the liberation anniversary celebrations, should be seen as part of this effort. One of the Romanians asserted--with a tinge of boastfulness and characteristic anti-pathy--that if Budapest had Romania's raw materials and "military independence," it would be even more nationalistic than Romania.

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The barely concealed nationalist proclivities of the Hungarian people do, in fact, require frequent and vigorous statements from Budapest on the dangers of nationalism. Nevertheless, Budapest would not be averse to directing some oblique accusations at the Romanians. The traditional rancor between the two peoples is aggravated by current differences over Romanian treatment of its large Hungarian minority. Because Budapest is also under pressure to tighten up internally, the Hungarians would probably welcome the opportunity to carry the ideological spear for Moscow in an effort to demonstrate their loyalty.

The Romanian diplomat's assertions echo similar statements by his colleagues in Moscow, Bucharest, and Geneva. His remarks are also consistent with the Romanian practice of dramatizing to Western diplomats Bucharest's alleged problems with Moscow.

Although Romanian motivations for this spate of remarks are not yet clear, the private whispering campaign probably reflects Bucharest's anxiety over Soviet interest in closer political and economic policy coordination. In particular, the Ceausescu leadership seems fearful that the European security talks will issue documents that will in effect endorse the status quo in Europe. The Romanians seem to recognize that the combination of such an endorsement and their membership in the Soviet alliance system would undermine their ability to resist any Moscow-sponsored campaign for conformity and integration. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Women's Lib, Romanian Style

The post of chairperson of the National Council of Women (NCW) is now a cabinet-level position in Romania. Bucharest is the only one of the East European capitals to give such high recognition to the role of women in society. With this move, the NCW--headed by Lina Ciobanu, a member of the party's powerful political executive committee--joins three other mass organizations that have cabinet status.

Now that women constitute an increasingly important part of the labor force, Ceausescu may have decided that the NCW has the potential for becoming an effective tool for carrying party policy to a major segment of society.

There are, however, at least two stumbling blocks that could prevent women from achieving their full potential in Romanian society. One is President Ceausescu, who has tended to see women in the traditional role of bringing up and educating the younger generation. The other obstacle is Ceausescu's wife, Elena, who carefully reviews and screens female candidates for high party and state posts. All indications are that a particularly attractive and/or intelligent woman could find her career stymied by a jealous Ms. Ceausescu.
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Czechs to Build Pipeline for Soviets

Czechoslovakia has agreed to build a section of an oil pipeline in the USSR in exchange for crude oil deliveries in excess of amounts already scheduled in their 1975-1980 bilateral trade agreement, [REDACTED]

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The agreement is the second oil-payback project negotiated by an East European country with the Soviets in recent months. In December, Poland initialed a similar deal for an oil pipeline that will link Byelorussia and Estonia. Both Prague and Warsaw are likely to turn to Western suppliers for pipeline construction equipment. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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The Effect of Soviet Price Increases on Romania

Price increases on Soviet exports to Romania this year will probably be offset by rises in the cost of products imported from Romania, according to a Soviet official in Bucharest.

Bucharest and Moscow will limit price changes to less than 100 commodities so that a large number of bilateral and multilateral agreements will not be affected. Prices of iron ore, coke, consumer goods, petrochemicals, and some agricultural goods will be increased. Price hikes for Soviet oil and other raw materials will, however, result in sharp terms-of-trade declines for Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Romania does not import any Soviet crude oil and will export about 100,000 tons of oil products to the USSR this year. Prices of machinery, which is a relatively small item in trade between the two countries and is close to balancing, will remain the same. But machinery prices for countries like Hungary and East Germany that sell much more machinery to the Soviet Union than they import will be boosted. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Changes in the Leadership of the
USSR Academy of Sciences

With the approach of the 250th Jubilee Session of the USSR Academy of Sciences in May of this year, some significant changes have occurred at the highest levels of the academy. [REDACTED]

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Anatoly Alekseyevich Logunov has recently been appointed the academy's first vice president, a slot left vacant since the death of M. D. Millionshchikov in early 1973. Logunov has risen rapidly in the academy ranks, having been elected a corresponding member in 1968, an active member in 1973, and a vice president in November 1974. Despite his new appointment, he is probably not a front runner to succeed academy president M. V. Keldysh, nor is he expected to be the academy's international spokesman, as was his predecessor.

[REDACTED] Millionshchikov's duties as head of the Soviet Pugwash and Arms Control delegations have been assumed by academician M. A. Markov. Logunov's new assignment, however, may be an attempt to ensure a traditional approach to science at the highest levels of the academy.

Logunov began his career in elementary particle physics in 1957 under the tutelage of N. N. Bogolyubov at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research in Dubna. One of the foremost Soviet authorities on theoretical physics, Bogolyubov enjoys the political favor of the regime because of his traditional scientific views, and apparently wields considerable power in the academy. As a member of Bogolyubov's "school," Logunov probably enjoys similar political favor and has undoubtedly been catapulted upward in the academy ranks with Bogolyubov's backing.

[REDACTED] Aleksandr Alekseyevich Kulakov has been appointed head of the

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academy's Foreign Relations Department, following the recent retirement of S. G. Korneyev. An old hand in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kulakov served as an official and then as an attache in the Soviet embassy in London from 1953 to 1963. Subsequently, he was assigned as second, then first secretary for scientific affairs at the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen during 1966-70. In 1971 he became deputy chief of the academy's Foreign Relations Department, where he was responsible for arranging scientific exchanges and for receiving foreign scientific delegations. Kulakov lacks an extensive scientific background, although he stated in 1972 that he had been trained as an electrical engineer. He is not a member of the academy. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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